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Abstract
Do employers in coordinated market economies (CME’s) actively defend the non-liberal, mar-
ket-constraining institutions upon which their strategic coordination and competitive success 
depends? This paper revisits the debate over firms’ employer preferences with an in-depth ex-
amination of employers in Germany – a paradigmatic CME and crucial “test case” for Varieties 
of Capitalism. It is based on interviews with key officials and an in-depth examination of a 
large-scale campaign – the New Social Market Initiative or INMS – founded and funded by 
German metalworking employers to shape public opinion. The paper argues that German em-
ployers have a strong preference for liberalization: they have pushed hard for the liberalization 
of labor markets, the reduction of government expenditures, the expansion of market-oriented 
freedoms, and cuts to social protection, employment protection and benefit entitlements. I find 
no empirical support for the claim that the INSM is an attempt to appease discontented firms 
within employers’ associations. On the contrary: for many employers, the Agenda 2010 reforms 
did not go far enough. Following the discrediting of the Anglo-American model in the financial 
crisis, far-reaching concessions by employees, and the unexpected revitalization of the German 
economy, employers have moderated their demands – but liberalization remains their default 
preference. This paper also addresses the role of ideas and the conditions under which employer 
campaigns can influence policy.
Zusammenfassung
Verteidigen Arbeitgeber in koordinierten Marktwirtschaften aktiv die nichtliberalen, marktbe-
schränkenden Institutionen, von denen ihre Möglichkeiten zur strategischen Koordination und 
ihr Erfolg im Wettbewerb abhängen? Mit einer umfassenden Untersuchung der Präferenzen von 
Arbeitgebern in Deutschland, das als typisches Beispiel einer koordinierten Marktwirtschaft 
und wegweisender „Testfall“ für die Theorie über Spielarten des Kapitalismus gilt, greift dieses 
Discussion Paper die Debatte über die Präferenzen von Unternehmen in ihrer Eigenschaft als 
Arbeitgeber auf. Es basiert auf Interviews mit führenden Arbeitgeberfunktionären sowie einer 
detaillierten Untersuchung der Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (INSM): einer groß an-
gelegten, von deutschen Metallarbeitgebern initiierten und finanzierten Kampagne zur öffent-
lichen Meinungsbildung. Der Beitrag belegt eine deutliche Präferenz deutscher Arbeitgeber für 
die Liberalisierung. Mit Nachdruck haben sie sich für eine Liberalisierung der Arbeitsmärkte, 
eine Senkung der Staatsausgaben und eine Ausweitung marktorientierter Gestaltungsfreiheiten 
ebenso eingesetzt wie für Einschnitte bei der sozialen Sicherung, dem Kündigungsschutz und 
den Versorgungsansprüchen. Die Behauptung, die INSM sei ein Versuch, unzufriedene Unter-
nehmen innerhalb der Arbeitgeberverbände zu beschwichtigen, lässt sich durch die empirischen 
Befunde nicht stützen. Im Gegenteil: Vielen Arbeitgebern gingen die Reformen im Zuge der 
Agenda 2010 nicht weit genug. Zwar haben die deutschen Arbeitgeber nach der Diskreditierung 
des angloamerikanischen Modells während der Finanzkrise, weitreichenden Zugeständnissen 
seitens der Arbeitnehmer sowie der unerwarteten Wiederbelebung der deutschen Wirtschaft 
ihre Forderungen gemäßigt – doch bleibt ihre grundlegende Präferenz für die Liberalisierung 
bestehen. Dieser Beitrag befasst sich außerdem mit der Rolle von Ideen sowie den Bedingungen, 
unter denen Arbeitgeberkampagnen politische Maßnahmen beeinflussen können.
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Challenging Varieties of Capitalism’s Account of Business 
Interests: The New Social Market Initiative and German 
Employers’ Quest for Liberalization, 2000–2014
1 Introduction: Varieties of Capitalism and liberalization theorists’ views of 
employer preferences
Interests and ideas drive human behavior, but some interests and ideas matter more than 
others. Even in the waning years of “embedded liberalism,” there was growing recogni-
tion that business occupies a “privileged position” in society (Lindblom 1977). With the 
growth of business power vis-à-vis states and other interest groups, scholars have be-
come preoccupied with the question “what does business want?” Scholars agree that “in 
capitalist democracies, employers exercise very significant power” (Thelen 2010: 201), 
but disagree about the implications of business power. 
Does the removal of constraints on business imply that employers will push to retrench 
generous welfare states, social protections, and market-constraining institutions? Yes, 
say liberalization and power resource theorists (Amable/Palombarini 2009; Baccaro/
Howell 2011; Emmenegger/Marx 2011; Korpi 2006; Paster 2012a, 2013; Streeck 2009). 
According to Wolfgang Streeck, capitalists are “fundamentally unruly” vis-à-vis social 
institutions: 
Capitalist firms and those that own and run them can only for so long be treated as patient 
cogs in a collectively serviceable machine. Then, their true nature must come to the fore again, 
revealing them to be the live predators that they are, for which politically imposed social obli-
gations are nothing but bars of a cage bound to be too small for them and for their insatiable 
desire for the hunt … Capitalists … are the modern, nontraditionalist economic actors par 
excellence … this is why they are fundamentally unruly: a permanent source of disorder from 
the perspective of social institutions, relentlessly whacking away at social rules, continuously 
forcing rulers to re-write them … (Streeck 2009: 234–235, 241)
By contrast, proponents of Varieties of Capitalism (VofC) – the most influential theo-
retical approach of the past fifteen years – deny that globalization and the growth of 
business power will lead to competitive deregulation. At the core of VofC is the idea 
that employer interests vary systematically across the LME/CME (liberal market econo-
This paper was written in 2013, while I was a visiting scholar at the Max Planck Institute for the Study 
of Societies. I am grateful to the MPIfG as well as to Marius Busemeyer, Martin Höpner, Thomas 
Paster, Dieter Plehwe, Gerhard Schnyder, Dennis Spies, and participants at the 2014 CES and SASE 
conferences for very helpful comments. I also wish to thank all of my interviewees; this article would 
have been impossible without their openness and generosity. I take full responsibility for all remain-
ing errors.
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my/coordinated market economy) divide (Hall/Soskice 2001; Hall/Thelen 2009; Mares 
2003; Thelen 2014). Whereas employers in LMEs lobby aggressively for liberalization 
and deregulation, employers in CMEs actively support and defend the non-liberal, mar-
ket-constraining institutions upon which their strategic coordination and competitive 
success depends. 
In this vein, Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, and Thierry Verdier contrast the “cud-
dly” capitalists in Northern European CMEs with their “cutthroat” counterparts in 
LMEs (Acemoglu/Robinson/Verdier 2012). Kathleen Thelen posits that coalitions led 
by employers 
have certainly proved capable of heading off full liberalization and defending – for themselves 
– the arrangements long associated with coordinated capitalism … For all the reasons laid out 
in the VofC literature, industrial firms and their workers will jointly defend – for themselves – 
traditional institutions and practices … Manufacturing employers will not be at the forefront 
of demands for across-the-board liberalization … (Thelen 2014: 23, 30)
Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank find that Danish business associations “staved off 
neoliberal attacks” (Martin/Swank 2012: 188). Gregory Jackson and Gerhard Schnyder 
state that businesses in Germany have “supported only moderate reforms” (Schnyder/
Jackson 2013: 332). Anke Hassel writes that “the business community has not pressed 
for the wholesale deregulation of the labour market” and has instead preferred “patchy” 
liberalization (Hassel 2014: 77, 62). 
The crux of the debate between VofC and liberalization theorists boils down to dif-
ferent understandings of employer interests.1 Do employers in CMEs actively support 
and defend non-liberal institutions, as VofC asserts? Or are they striving to break free 
from these constraints on their market freedom, as liberalization theorists aver? If the 
evidence is mixed, why do employers’ strategies vary over time? This paper contributes 
to this debate with an in-depth examination of employer preferences in Germany – a 
paradigmatic CME, a crucial “test case” for Varieties of Capitalism, and “a ‘model’ for 
countries unwilling to subject themselves to the rule of the market in the same way 
and to the same extent as Anglo-American economies” (Streeck 2009: 21). It is based 
on interviews with leading employers’ association officials and a detailed analysis of 
the Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (INSM) or New Social Market Initiative, a 
large-scale campaign founded and funded by the employers’ association Gesamtmetall 
in 2000 to shape public opinion. 
Nearly a decade and a half and hundreds of articles after Hall and Soskice’s seminal 
study, do we really need another contribution on this topic? I believe we do. Given the 
importance of employer interests as a building block of comparative political economy, 
our understanding of employer preferences and strategies needs to be brought up to 
1 Kathleen Thelen, remarks given at lecture at the Penn Temple European Studies colloquium; 
Philadelphia, USA; December 6, 2013.
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speed. The evidence in this paper suggests that there is a lot of support for liberaliza-
tion in the core sectors of the German economy. Claims that German employers have 
an overriding preference for non-liberal institutions or that their defense of traditional 
institutions constrains liberalization are hard to sustain. The reality is quite the oppo-
site: employers have a fundamentally liberal orientation or Grundgesinnung and prefer a 
reduction of benefit entitlements and constraints on market activity. If we follow Vivien 
Schmidt and Mark Thatcher’s definition of neoliberalism as, “at its essence … involving 
a commitment to certain core principles focused on market competition and a limited 
state” (Schmidt/Thatcher 2013: 1), then German employers’ orientations are neoliberal. 
But can a large-scale public relations campaign reveal what employers really want? 
While the INSM is not necessarily representative of German business as a whole, it can 
tell us a great deal about the interests of Gesamtmetall, its founder and funder. Gesamt-
metall represents employers’ associations in the metalworking and electrical engineering 
industries – Germany’s leading economic sector and the area where VofC is most likely to 
apply. Gesamtmetall and its member associations have delegated the tasks of articulating 
and disseminating positions on institutional reform and public policy to the INSM. Be-
cause of its formal separation from Gesamtmetall and collective bargaining institutions, 
the INSM has greater freedom to communicate and critique the institutional status quo. 
This suggests that although the INSM is not necessarily a more trustworthy expression 
of employer interests than other more moderate discourses, the INSM is indispensable 
for gaining a full understanding of employer preferences in Germany.
Of course, statements made by campaigns such as the INSM reflect a variety of mo-
tives. As a PR campaign, the INSM needs press coverage; and in order to get it, the staff 
may sharpen some messages to incite controversy or moderate others in response to 
anti-market shifts in public opinion. For these reasons, the INSM’s statements cannot 
necessarily be taken at face value or as one-to-one representations of employers’ under-
lying preferences. Some authors have extended this line of thought by suggesting that 
the function of the INSM is not to represent employer interests at all, but to appease 
discontented SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) within employers’ associa-
tions. In the second section of this paper, I examine these claims and find no empirical 
support for them. In order to increase confidence in my findings and better understand 
employers’ underlying interests, I conducted more than a dozen interviews with leading 
officials. Three of these officials generously read a draft of this paper, and stated that 
they agree “to a very large extent” with the arguments made herein.2
Recent comparative political economy scholarship acknowledges the INSM’s role in 
the German political economy, but only in passing (Hassel/Schiller 2010; Paster 2012a; 
Silvia 2013; Streeck 2009). While there is a sizeable German-language literature on the 
INSM (Nicoll 2009; Speth 2004), commentators disagree over the initiative’s goals. Some 
2 Nico Fickinger, personal communication, June 11, 2014; on behalf of Nico Fickinger, Ulrich 
Brocker, and Volcker Fasbender. 
4 MPIfG Discussion Paper 14 /16
argue that because it was founded by German employers’ associations, a foundational 
element of Germany’s non-liberal model, the INSM does not strive for significant liber-
alization. Others argue that the INSM pushes for a full-scale neoliberal reconstruction 
of German institutions. I suggest that even where the INSM fails to advocate for full-
scale liberalization, this should not necessarily be taken as support for the institutional 
status quo. Interviews conducted by the author suggest that while German employers 
are not pushing for a wholesale dismantling of Germany’s CME institutions, some are 
skeptical that they provide a comparative institutional advantage. While the analysis 
shows that German employers are not the institutional patriots VofC makes them out 
to be, their strategy is also more complex than a blanket opposition to non-liberal in-
stitutions. Whether employers view institutions as a useful resource or a burdensome 
constraint depends on their specific and concrete manifestation. A fine line can separate 
useful resources from burdensome constraints, and institutions which from a distance 
appear simply as traditional CME institutions may be one or the other. Recognizing 
that institutions are “highly malleable,” employers have sought to reduce burdensome 
constraints and “expand employer discretion” (Baccaro/Howell 2011: 522, 527). 
The INSM is influential. At the time of its heyday, Manfred G. Schmidt described it 
as a bourgeois extra-parliamentary opposition and as “the most influential lobby that 
market-liberals ever had in Germany” (Höfer 2010: 405). Since its founding, the INSM 
has done much to bolster the economic reform and liberalization agenda in Germany. 
Just as one “cannot overestimate the importance” of Swedish neoliberal think tanks “for 
understanding the transformation of the Swedish model” (Blyth 2001: 16), the INSM 
is crucial for understanding the transformations of the German political economy 
during the past fifteen years: “despite unfavourable institutional conditions for major 
change, the German welfare state and its labour market policy have undergone substan-
tial changes” (Fleckenstein 2013: 56). Lucio Baccaro and Chiara Benassi find that “even 
though traditional institutions are still formally in place, the whole system is much 
leaner and meaner than in the past” (Baccaro/Benassi 2014: 2). Given that approximate-
ly 4,000 media statements per month could be traced to the INSM in the mid-2000s 
(INSM 2009), and approximately 400,000 people now view the INSM’s Facebook page 
each day (Pellengahr, interview 2014), it is plausible to claim that the INSM has played 
an important role in effecting this transformation. 
This paper supports the author’s previous findings (Kinderman 2005): employers’ de-
fault position is liberalization, and their preference for liberalization is stronger than 
VofC allows. But this paper also goes beyond those findings to show the considerable 
variation in the tone and the effectiveness of INSM strategies over time. Examining it 
can help us to answer the million-dollar question: do employers prefer thoroughgo-
ing liberalization, as liberalization theorists claim, or do they prefer more flexibility 
within existing structures, as coordinationists claim? In short, the answer is: it depends. 
During the initial period (2000–2006), the INSM was an outspoken advocate of far-
reaching institutional change. The INSM played a proactive and agenda-setting role, 
and many of its positions were radical and point to a Systemwechsel or shift towards an 
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LME-style model. Employers wanted to go further than the Agenda 2010 reforms but 
were prevented from doing so by public opinion and the governing CDU-SPD coali-
tion. By contrast, since 2006 – and particularly since 2008/2009 – the INSM’s critique 
has softened and its campaigns have become more moderate and defensive. Following 
the discrediting of the Anglo-American model in the financial crisis, significant wage 
repression by German employees and the unexpected revitalization and resurgence of 
the German economy, employers have re-discovered the virtues of the (new) German 
model. Liberalization theory is more consistent with these developments than VofC, but 
it too may overestimate companies’ and employers’ associations’ strategic foresight. The 
new German model is the unintended consequence of these developments, rather than 
the result of rational design or employers’ defense of traditional institutions.
These developments raise a series of questions which will be explored in the pages be-
low: what explains the change in the INSM’s strategies over time? What explains the 
greater effectiveness of the INSM’s strategies in the first period compared with the sec-
ond one? Why did governments take employers’ complaints more seriously in the first 
period than in the second one? Examining why the INSM succeeded in influencing 
policy in some periods and failed in others can enhance our understanding of the dis-
cursive, ideational and structural power of business: “Arguments about the structural 
power of business in relation to state policymakers thus need to focus on the dynamics 
of a particular type of constitutive relationship” (Bell 2012: 671). This exercise can also 
enhance our understanding of the role of ideas in institutional change. According to 
Vivien Schmidt, this research needs to grapple with the question of “how, when, where, 
and why ideas and discourse matter for institutional change, and when they do not” 
(Schmidt 2010: 21). 
This paper is organized as follows. The second section explains how the INSM sheds 
light on German employer preferences and addresses the argument that its real pur-
pose is to appease discontented SMEs. The third section discusses the INSM’s origins in 
the late 1990s. The fourth section describes the INSM’s programmatic agenda, and the 
fifth section discusses the INSM’s push for liberalization between 2003 and 2005. The 
sixth section addresses the INSM’s moderation after 2006 and especially following the 
financial crisis. The seventh section discusses what leading employers have to say about 
institutions. The eighth section addresses objections to my argument. The ninth section 
concludes the paper. 
2 The INSM and German employer preferences
The underlying premise of this paper is that because Gesamtmetall is the principal and 
the INSM is the agent, and because the latter has limited autonomy from the former, 
the INSM sheds light on what German employers want. The INSM’s governance struc-
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ture suggests that it enjoys broad support among Germany’s metalworking and electri-
cal industries’ employers’ associations. The money for the INSM comes from Gesamt-
metall’s regional employers’ associations. The INSM’s supervisory board is composed 
of representatives from Gesamtmetall and Gesamtmetall’s regional employers’ associa-
tions. Gesamtmetall’s member associations play a very important role in determining 
the content of the INSM: the supervisory board meets 3-4 times per year to decide on 
the INSM’s strategy, which leads the staff to pursue specific PR and advertising strate-
gies. In its attempt to influence public opinion, the INSM draws on advertisements, PR, 
events, scientific studies, blogs, and an extensive online presence.3 Gesamtmetall gave 
the INSM a clear mandate to propagate and popularize Ordoliberal/neoliberal ideas 
and reforms. To date, Gesamtmetall has spent in excess of 130 million euros to fund the 
INSM’s activities (10 million euros per year from 2000–2009, 8.8 million euros per year 
from 2009–2014) – not exactly cheap talk. 
The INSM does have some operational autonomy from Gesamtmetall: the organiza-
tion has its own staff and ambassadors, and public relations and advertising compa-
nies (2000–2009: Scholz & Friends, 2009–2014: Serviceplan) disseminate the INSM’s 
messages. Yet it is not the case that “Gesamtmetall just pays the [INSM’s] bills” (Silvia 
2013: 216). Instead, Gesamtmetall leads the INSM “on a long leash” (Speth 2004: 5). The 
INSM’s advisory board plays an important role here: Gesamtmetall’s executives and the 
presidents of all of Gesamtmetall’s regional employers’ associations meet with INSM 
staff three times each year to assess the latter’s activities and to discuss priorities and 
strategies. The INSM’s strategies are always agreed upon with Gesamtmetall. Depend-
ing on the situation, Gesamtmetall may play a very active role and prompt the INSM 
to prioritize certain topics (Rath, interview 2012). Thus, a survey of the INSM’s initia-
tives will furnish insights into the reforms that German employers want. But perhaps 
the INSM is just public relations and “verbal radicalism” to placate discontented SMEs: 
Superficially, the purpose of the campaign was to mobilize and publicize new ideas for the 
deregulation and liberalization of the economy. But in reality its function was to deflect the 
discontented Mittelstand’s criticism of wage settlements which favored large firms.
(Hassel/Schiller 2010: 126)
Not surprisingly, INSM staffs reject these assertions. The INSM’s founder, Ulrich 
Brocker, claims that “the function of the INSM was never and is not a response to intra-
organizational dynamics. Instead, it is communication and advertising for rationally 
justifiable framework for a properly understood social market economy.”4 Nico Fick-
inger, formerly in charge of the INSM in Gesamtmetall and now the managing director 
of Nordmetall, states that “it was never the purpose of the INSM to placate dissatisfied 
firms or keep them within associations, but only to create a favorable environment for 
necessary market-oriented reforms.”5 My interviewees also point out that the central 
3 www.insm.de
4 Ulrich Brocker, personal communication, July 6 2013.
5 Nico Fickinger, personal communication, June 11 2014.
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impetus for the INSM came from large internationalized German companies with for-
eign supply chains (Fasbender, interview 2013; Engemann, interview 2013), which con-
tradicts claims that the INSM was created to appease the Mittelstand. 
So does the fact, discussed below, that Ulrich Brocker came up with the idea for the 
INSM in Südwestmetall, the regional employers’ association in Baden-Württemberg. 
This is significant because association membership unbound by collective bargaining 
agreements with unions has played a relatively insignificant role in Südwestmetall (Beh-
rens 2011: 174). Firms unbound by collective bargaining agreements are disproportion-
ately SMEs. By contrast, the regional employers’ associations in Bavaria and Saxony “are 
pushing a more or less aggressive collective bargaining strategy by using the ‘unbound’ 
association … to put pressure on the union and by recommending their members 
to join the ‘unbound’ association in case they disagree with the collective bargaining 
norms” (Haipeter 2011: 182). Thus, the fact that the INSM did not originate in Bavaria 
or Saxony also speaks against Hassel’s thesis. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that many SMEs are critical of Gesamtmetall’s use of their association membership fees 
to finance PR campaigns. Dieter Rath, the INSM’s first director, recalls that at meet-
ings with INSM staff, SMEs would indignantly say “what are you doing with our good 
money?!” (Rath, interview 2012).
Digging deeper, it is hard to find empirical support for the Mittelstand thesis. If it were 
true, the INSM would draw attention to wage settlements, wage bargaining issues or 
the plight of the Mittelstand. Yet when the INSM was founded it was explicitly decided 
that it would not address collective bargaining issues (Speth 2004). Figure 1 shows press 
coverage of the INSM that also mentions the Mittelstand.
A very small proportion of INSM press releases and coverage mention the Mittelstand. 
In 2003, seven percent of articles in the LexisNexis German newspaper database contain 
both these terms, but for all other years, fewer than five percent do. Conversely, a search 
of the major lobby organization for SMEs in Germany, the Familienunternehmer or ASU 
reveals scarcely any references to the INSM. These findings cast doubt on the claim that 
the INSM serves to placate the Mittelstand. None of this implies that tensions between 
small and large firms do not exist – but Gesamtmetall has sought to address these intra-
association tensions through unbound membership and the 2003 Pforzheim agreement 
rather than through the INSM (Behrens 2011: 168).6 
The section below discusses the origins of the INSM in the late 1990s. 
6 Also Urich Brocker, personal communication July 6, 2013.
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3 The origins of the INSM in the late 1990s 
“We were at a dead end [in einer Sackgasse] … there were more and more recessive tendencies.” 
(Volker Fasbender, managing director of Hessenmetall and one of the INSM’s founding figures; 
Interview 2013)
Political and economic considerations led Gesamtmetall to set up the INSM. By the 
mid-1990s, the survival of the German model was in question. Germany was mired 
in “a deep structural crisis” (Creutzburg, interview 2013), a “catastrophic equilibrium” 
(Dyson 2005) of rising unemployment and high non-wage labor costs. A climate of 
Reformstau lay over the whole country, and deteriorating economic conditions led to a 
growing discontentment in the business community (Streeck 2005). 
According to the INSM’s founders, rising levels of social protection were the underly-
ing cause of these pathologies (Brocker, interview 2013; Fasbender, interview 2013). As 
Ulrich Brocker, founder of the INSM and former managing director of Südwestmetall 
and Gesamtmetall, recalls, “contributions to unemployment insurance became more 
expensive, competition was growing and the pressure became harder … Eventually the 
advantages that Germany enjoyed were used up” (Interview 2013). 
Yet instead of taking decisive steps to address these problems, politicians implemented 
costly new welfare-state programs to please voters. Employers failed to halt the imple-
mentation of long-term care insurance in the early 1990s, which “catalyzed [employ-
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Figure 1 Journalistic coverage of the INSM and Mittelstand 
Percent
Source: LexisNexis, various years.
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ers’] strategic reorientation from accommodation to assertiveness … Employers real-
ized that reacting to proposals by other actors was not enough to defend their interests; 
they had to try to define the reform agenda proactively” (Paster 2012a: 168). 
For Brocker, the 1996 conflict over reductions in sick pay from 100 to 80 percent was 
clear evidence of the public’s hostility to reforms (Interview 2013). Unions protested, 
and the SPD vowed that they would reverse the cuts – which they did once in office. 
The public’s hostility towards reforms contributed to Helmut Kohl’s 1998 election loss. 
The views of the general population and of companies were drifting further and fur-
ther apart, and discontentment within business was growing. As a result of growing 
pressure from the latter, the INSM could have been founded as early as the mid-1990s 
(Fasbender, interview 2013); but a public opinion poll in the summer of 1999 proved 
decisive. The poll showed that German citizens mistrusted business and the market and 
supported a generous welfare state. Two thirds of respondents viewed the prospect of 
upcoming economic reforms with attitudes ranging from “skepticism” to “fear,” (Ge-
sellschaft im Zwiespalt 2000: 16), and 42 percent favored a third way between capitalism 
and socialism (Speth 2004: 7).
Gesamtmetall founded the INSM to influence agenda setting – what do people talk 
about? – and bring about a change in the public opinion climate which would, accord-
ing to Gesamtmetall’s press officer Werner Riek, “get our fellow citizens to recognize 
what we see as necessary reforms as a positive reform.” It was necessary to take proactive 
steps to inform the public and “halt the decline/demise” (Niedergang) of the country 
which was underway (Fasbender, interview 2013):
Beginning in the 60s there was an increasing entitlement mentality, more and more demands 
on society and less and less individual responsibility … The point [of the INSM] was to connect 
the social market economy with the essentials of entrepreneurial activity: competition, com-
petitiveness, flexibility. All of this contradicts welfare state thinking that focuses on protection, 
excessive rigidity [Betonierung], and all that. (Brocker, interview 2013)
There was also a political dimension. Employers were concerned that Chancellor Ger-
hard Schröder’s newly elected Red-Green government, with its left-wing finance Min-
ister Oskar Lafontaine, would pursue an anti-business and redistributive agenda. The 
INSM was founded to ensure that even under a Red-Green government, employers 
could pass laws that are employer- and business-friendly. Brocker’s ideas struck a chord 
in Südwestmetall, the regional employers’ association in Baden-Wurttemberg which 
he directed at the time; Hessenmetall joined in, and Gesamtmetall also supported the 
idea, as did many large and small firms (Engemann, interview 2013).7 In the fall of 
1999, Gesamtmetall invited companies to tender bids and selected the advertising com-
pany Scholz & Friends as the winner. The INSM began its work on June 1, 2000. The 
next section discusses the first phase of the INSM from the late 1990s until 2006, when 
7 The chemical industry’s employers’ association VCI almost joined the INSM, but the former 
feared that the latter would endanger their cooperative relations with unions. 
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the INSM advocated radical institutional change and quite possibly a Systemwechsel 
(change of system) to a more liberal institutional framework. 
4 The agenda of the new social market economy 
The INSM campaign is entitled the “neue soziale Marktwirtschaft” – the “New Social 
Market Economy” – although its goal is to restore the “old” social market economy 
(Kinderman 2005).8 The social market economy is the founding myth of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Haselbach 1997). For the Ordoliberals in the 1950s, the term 
stood for the view that free market competition is the best way to achieve social goals 
(Paster 2012a). The prominence and currency of “social market economy” discourse 
in Germany is remarkable; it would be no exaggeration to say that it is hegemonic as 
far as economic and social policy is concerned. As Haselbach emphasizes, “[t]he tale of 
the ‘social market economy’ … is referred to almost every day, somewhere in a German 
newspaper or political statement; it has become part of the national memory” (Hasel-
bach 1977: 161). The genius of the “social market economy” lies in its versatility: it is 
both “social” (fair/just) and a “[capitalist] market.” The INSM is focused on the disjunc-
ture between the historically evolved social market economy and its ideational origins. 
As Ralf Ptak points out, 
Since the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party learned to use the concept in the same 
opportunistic way as ordoliberals, persuading governments to expand the welfare state under 
continuous reference to the social market economy, the model increasingly lost its original neo-
liberal content. (Ptak 2009: 125) 
The INSM’s founders have sought to move Germany’s discourse, policy, and institu-
tions closer to the social market economy’s Ordoliberal origins. Just as Ordoliberal-
ism’s founders “were hostile in principle towards social welfare as a state responsibil-
ity” (Haselbach 1997: 172), the INSM is suffused with a thoroughly liberal ethos. As 
Fasbender remarks, “freedom is the central value of the Social Market Economy” (In-
terview 2013). While many German citizens associate the social market economy with 
the welfare state or “Vater Staat,”9 the INSM’s founder Ulrich Brocker states that he is 
“for the social market economy but against the welfare state” (Interview 2013). Randolf 
Rodenstock concurs. As president of the Bavarian employers’ and metalworking in-
8 Which “old” social market economy? The one that existed before it was “hijacked” by special 
interest groups and distorted by excessive welfare-state interventionism. When exactly this oc-
curred is not clear. Already in 1958, when German social policy was in its infancy, the Ordo-
liberal theorist Wilhelm Röpke thought that West German economic policy had taken a turn 
towards excessive interventionism. He declared that the state should place itself as a “guardian 
of the market” above societal interest groups (Haselbach 1991: 172).
9 “Father State,” a term that apparently exists in no other language.
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dustry association, vice-president of Gesamtmetall, and a member of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, the world’s foremost “neoliberal thought collective,” (Mirowski/Plehwe 2009), 
Rodenstock writes that “the social market economy has gotten out of balance over the 
years … Instead of promoting self-reliance,” he chides that “Germany has developed 
into a welfare state” (Rodenstock 2009). 
Rodenstock’s book Chancen für alle is centered on the idea of equality of opportunity in 
free markets (Rodenstock 2001). This distinctly liberal world view seems quite appro-
priate for an LME, and it is hard to reconcile with Bismarkian status maintenance and 
VofC’s vision of long-term investments in firm-specific skills. Rodenstock praises the 
United States and suggests that Germany should model itself on America’s flexible labor 
and product markets and low levels of regulation (Rodenstock 2001: 178). Because the 
social market relies on efficient self-regulation, it only needs a minimum of ethics and 
rules (Rodenstock 2001: 28). Market distorting institutions are unnecessary and coun-
terproductive because the market itself is fair and just: it rewards performance and is 
based on equality of opportunity (Rodenstock 2001: 25). 
Rodenstock emphasizes the need for flexiblization and deregulation in general, and of 
labor markets in particular; and the creation of jobs as the overriding goal of social 
policy and the principal requirement of social justice. “Badly paid jobs are better than 
none at all. … A guiding principal of the new social market economy is the motto: Just 
is whatever creates employment” (Rodenstock 2001: 54–55). This motto has had a sig-
nificant impact on German public debate and on public policy. In 2002, the INSM made 
it the focus of a large-scale advertising campaign. “The purpose of this initiative was 
to redefine the term ‘social’ out of the widespread, but one-sided orientation towards 
government redistribution” (INSM 2009). In the fall of 2002, this motto was used by 
CDU/CSU and FDP political candidates before Wolfgang Clement, then minister of 
labor and economics, adopted it as the more or less official slogan of the Agenda 2010 
labor market reforms. It is seldom recognized that the INSM created the central motto 
of the Agenda 2010. 
Former Bundesbank president and first INSM chairperson Hans Tietmeyer’s statements 
are also hard to reconcile with the view that German employers are opposed to liber-
alization. In an early INSM publication, Tietmeyer explicitly refers to a Systemwechsel 
or change of economic model, and makes clear where the journey should go: “the New 
Social Market economy is equivalent with the Anglo-Saxon, the American principle” 
and stresses that the road ahead will not be easy: “the necessary reforms and cutbacks 
will entail social hardships” and “bitter medicine” (Tietmeyer 2001: 8, 22). 
In 2003, the INSM challenged trade unions with the motto “Less welfare state means 
more jobs,” and by declaring May 1 to be the day to create jobs through supply-side re-
forms. In 2004, the INSM placed a sign that read: “It’s high time for reforms: GERMANY” 
at a prominent place in the Spree river in Berlin. The sign was hung so that GERMANY 
was half submerged under the water, to symbolize the gravity of Germany’s situation.
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And in 2005, the INSM provided a two-page article to the daily newspaper Die Welt en-
titled “The Greatest Job Destroyers of the Federal Republic” (Hahne/INSM 2005). This 
article critiques co-determination, employment protection, and labor market regula-
tion – the central institutions of the CMEs. I summarize the worst offenders and their 
offenses below: 
Table 1 The Greatest Job Destroyers of the Federal Republic
Chancellor Parties Years Problems according to INSM
1. Willy Brandt & 
Helmut Schmidt
SPD & FDP 1974–1982 Co-determination and deficit spending
2. Helmut Kohl CDU & FDP 1991–1998 Burdens of Reunification, high wage 
settlements
3. Kurt Georg Kiesinger CDU & SPD 1966–1969 Federalism hinders reforms & tax competition 
4. Gerhard Schröder SPD & Greens 1998–2002 “Strangulation” of the labor market
5. Helmut Kohl CDU & FDP 1982–1991 Reforms too timid
6. Konrad Adenauer CDU & FDP 1949–1963 Employment Protection Legislation
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
The article’s criticism of deficit spending, high wage settlements, and excessive tax bur-
dens may not raise many eyebrows – these are the complaints one expects from a busi-
ness advocacy organization. However, critiques of the 1976 co-determination law and 
employment protection legislation should be unsettling for VofC scholars who believe 
that German employers depend on these institutions for their competitive strategies 
and defend them against political attacks. If that were really the case, Gesamtmetall 
would not spend significant amounts of money to publicize the message that “Kohl 
lacked the courage for radical reforms along the lines of Reagan in the USA or Thatcher 
in the UK” (Hahne/INSM 2005: 13). The next section examines employer positions 
between 2003 and the 2005 Bundestag election in greater detail. 
5 Pressing for liberalization: The INSM from 2003 until 2005 
From 2003 until the 2005 election, there was widespread agreement on the necessity 
of liberalization and welfare-state reform in the German political establishment. Em-
ployers were less constrained by electoral politics during these years than at perhaps 
any other time in postwar German history. And the INSM was influential. During 
these years, the INSM “had public opinion leadership,” recalls Max Höfer, one of the 
INSM’s former directors (Interview 2013). This is important for my argument because 
as Thomas Paster points out, it allows us to see if employers played an agenda-setting 
role or simply responded to reform initiatives by other actors (Paster 2014: 17–18). 
If VofC is correct, and employers have structurally conservative employer preferences, 
they should “hit the brakes” and caution politicians from liberalizing too much as this 
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could undermine the institutional foundations of their competitive advantage (Thelen 
2014: 19; Hall/Soskice 2001: 58; Wood 2001). But if employers have a preference for 
liberalization, they should push down the gas pedal and press for further liberalization. 
In this section of the paper, I find that employer positions more closely approximate the 
latter position than the former. Indeed, there is evidence that employers wanted to go 
further than the Agenda 2010 reforms. 
From 2003 until the 2005 elections, employers clearly supported the CDU and FDP, 
which had criticized the Red-Green government for adopting too few reforms and too 
little liberalization. This section reconstructs employer attitudes as the Hartz and Agen-
da 2010 reforms got underway. Lenin is reported to have famously said: “There are de-
cades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” The first few 
months of 2003, when Schröder announced his Agenda 2010, represent the latter – “a 
decisive turning point in the history of the semisovereign German state” (Streeck 2005: 
163). The INSM was a crucial facilitator for these developments; it laid the foundations 
for this shift: 
We in the INSM had devised the central slogan of the Agenda 2010: “‘sozial ist, was Arbeit 
schafft” (just/fair is whatever creates work), and organized a broad platform of politicians, that 
supported the slogan: Wolfgang Clement, Olaf Scholz, Fritz Kuhn, Wolfgang Schäuble and Gui-
do Westerwelle … The credo‚ “sozial ist, was Arbeit schafft” redefined the word “sozial”: until 
then, the word meant that the state spent more money on students, on social assistance, on 
families, etc. The high unemployment forced us to rethink this: a job helps people more than 
social assistance. (Höfer 2013: 184)
In a 2003 newspaper column, INSM representative Hans Tietmeyer wrote: “Germany 
needs far-reaching market-oriented reforms. If necessary, these need to be implement-
ed despite disagreement with influential interest groups and parts of the [SPD’s] own 
party” (Tietmeyer 2003). This statement was made just three weeks before Schröder’s 
famous Agenda 2010 speech. In another column just one month later, INSM represen-
tative Oswald Metzger expressed that the “necessary retrenchment of the unaffordable 
welfare state will take until the end of the decade” (Metzger 2003). At an INSM-orga-
nized event in the fall of 2003, Friedrich Merz of the CDU’s business wing stressed the 
need for far-reaching reforms of the labor market, social transfer systems, the social 
safety net, the tax system, and the education system – “in sum almost excessive demands 
for politicians and citizens. But there is no alternative” (Merz 2003: 22). These examples 
illustrate the tight linkages between the INSM’s campaigns and the Agenda 2010. In 
the words of former INSM director Max Höfer, “We did Schröder’s public relations 
activities” (Höfer, interview 2013). At the height of its power, the INSM was influential. 
In one session of Germany’s most influential talk show “Sabine Christiansen,” three of 
the five guests were affiliated with the INSM; and between 2003 and 2008, up to 4,000 
media statements per month or over 120 per day were attributable to it (INSM 2009). 
The INSM also facilitated the Christian Democrats’ turn towards more business and 
market-friendly policies. The CDU’s 2003 Leipzig party convention agenda has been 
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characterized as “pure market culture” and as “the most market radical program in the 
party’s history … catapulting [Merkel’s] party into Anglo-Saxon capitalism” (Kessler 
2011). The CDU and FDP’s positions from the Leipzig party convention leading up 
to the 2005 Bundestag elections were far more radical than those typically analyzed 
by VofC scholars. The latter claim that employers “since the early 1980s have repeat-
edly failed to bite when presented with the carrot of deregulation” (Wood 2001: 408) 
and “had little interest” in a health insurance model which would call “for employers’ 
exit from financing health insurance altogether and substituting parity financing with 
compulsory, individual insurance born solely by workers” (Giaimo 2001: 354). But in 
the early 2000s, the INSM favored a transition to flat-rate health contributions to lower 
non-wage labor costs. Friedrich Merz also advocated this policy, and characterized it as 
a “paradigm shift” in Germany’s social policy and a departure from the existing trajec-
tory of the past 120 years (Merz 2003: 18). It is revealing that instead of cautioning over-
zealous politicians from jumping on the neoliberal bandwagon, “many top managers 
and entrepreneurs were enthusiastic about Merkel’s 2003 Leipziger Parteitag agenda” 
(Balzer 2008). They wanted to go further than the Hartz Reforms: they were not satisfied 
with the extent and rate of liberalization. 
In 2005, the INSM proclaimed that “Germany needs a comprehensive program of mar-
ket-oriented reforms that goes considerably beyond the Agenda 2010” (INSM 2005a: 8). 
The INSM praised Margaret Thatcher for not letting adverse circumstances or “fierce 
distributional conflicts” take her off the path of reforms (INSM 2005b: 47), and cited 
New Zealand, the UK, the USA, and Sweden as examples of successful welfare state re-
forms. The INSM also praised Ronald Reagan’s deregulation and tax cuts and Sweden’s 
decentralization of wage bargaining in the early 1990s (INSM 2005b: 48). In another 
publication, INSM author Ulrich van Suntum exalts Margaret Thatcher’s radical re-
forms and laments that these would not be possible in Germany’s political system (Van 
Suntum 2006: 132–133). Claims that “support for the welfare state is much broader, 
reaching deep in the business community” (Mares 2003: 265) are hard to sustain in 
light of this evidence. If that were really the case, would the business community fund 
a large-scale PR campaign that praises radical welfare state retrenchment and advocates 
flat-rate health insurance, a 25% flat-rate income tax, and other forms of the individu-
alization of risk? 
The mid-2000s presented employers with a larger liberalization carrot than ever be-
fore in the postwar period, and many wanted to bite. The language used by the INSM 
was that the Agenda 2010 was no more than “a step in the right direction,” and further 
reforms were demanded. An anonymous official close to the INSM and Gesamtmetall 
recalls that “according to the ‘hawks’ in Gesamtmetall, the INSM should attack the 
state and unions. Schröder’s Agenda 2010 did not go far enough.”10 But voters had had 
enough. By the summer of 2004, Angela Merkel’s Leipziger Parteitag Agenda had come 
under considerable pressure from within the CDU: 56 percent of CDU voters wanted 
10 Anonymous, personal communication; March 5, 2014. 
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the party to move in a more “social” or moderate direction while 31 percent favored 
“radical reform” (Clemens 2007: 234). In the spring of 2005, Merkel’s CDU/CSU had 
hit 45 percent in the polls, but in the Bundestag election on September 18, Merkel re-
ceived only 35 percent of the vote – a “traumatic defeat” and just marginally more than 
Schröder’s SPD (Clemens 2007: 239). Not employers but public opinion constrained 
reforms. 
VofC suggests that during the period of Hartz and Agenda 2010 reforms from 2003 
until 2005, employers should have cautioned overzealous politicians against too much 
liberalization. They did not. Instead, they became “a force for the liberalization of the 
welfare state and of labor markets” (Paster 2012a: 160). The preceding analysis suggests 
that if the CDU and the FDP had won a majority in the 2005 elections, employers would 
have pushed for further liberalization, with possibly far-reaching implications for the 
German model and for VofC. The fact that this did not occur is a contingent result of 
electoral politics rather than of German employers’ defense of traditional institutions. 
In the section below I discuss the INSM’s moderation after 2006. 
6 The moderation of the INSM since 2006
As the political winds shifted to the left, the INSM was forced into an increasingly de-
fensive position. Over the course of a decade, Germany’s political climate underwent 
a profound shift. In 2003, there was a political consensus on the necessity of reforms 
(even if these were contested by the rank and file). Through the INSM, German em-
ployers acted as motors and accelerators of the liberalization process. The Pforzheim 
collective bargaining agreement took place against the background of threats by both 
governing and opposition parties to legislate opening clauses in collective agreements 
if the social partners would not voluntarily agree to them. There was widespread mis-
trust in collective bargaining; BDI-president Michael Rogowski declared that collective 
bargaining agreements should be burned on a campfire. Within ten years the situation 
underwent “a complete reversal – it’s unbelievable,” remarks Dietrich Creutzburg (In-
terview 2013). In the early- to mid-2000s, the bourgeois parties supported the INSM’s 
liberalization agenda. Ten years later, these very same parties endorsed a statutory mini-
mum wage, and in 2014 the CDU-SPD coalition government adopted the country’s first 
national minimum wage. 
While the 2005 election results and the resulting CDU-SPD coalition government were 
widely seen as a referendum against reforms, the blowback from Germany’s labor mar-
ket reforms began with the so-called “Montagsdemonstrationen” protests against Hartz 
IV across Germany in 2004. This sentiment grew when SPD Chairman Franz Münte-
fering described private equity firms as “locusts” in the spring of 2005. The successful 
establishment of Die Linke, the left-wing party in the German party system, is just one 
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 14 /16
sign of this growing resistance. Elites had failed to win over citizens’ emotions for their 
reform agenda (Fleckenstein 2013: 74; Wolfrum 2013: 578), and many German citizens 
came to perceive the Agenda 2010 labor market reforms as unjust. Trade union and civil 
society efforts in opposition to radical neoliberal campaigning, such as the establish-
ment of LobbyControl in 2005, also contributed to this shift. In the words of Hubertus 
Engemann of NRW Metall, who was present at the founding of the INSM, “reforms 
were going in the right direction … but then the societal mainstream shifted to the left” 
(Engemann, interview 2013). Axel Rhein, a director at IW Medien, has been involved 
with the INSM since its inception. Rhein likens the public sphere to a stage, on which 
the INSM needs a megaphone in order to be heard. From 2000 until 2005, the INSM’s 
campaigns resonated in the media and in the CDU/FDP opposition, which, in turn, 
amplified the INSM’s messages. This changed under the grand coalition (Axel Rhein, 
interview 2014). 
These developments made the INSM’s work more difficult, and necessitated a stra-
tegic reorientation. From 2000-2005, the INSM’s negative campaigning style greased 
the wheels of liberalization. Following the 2005 elections and the formation of the 
CDU-SPD coalition government which comprised over two thirds of the Bundestag, 
the INSM’s campaigns became more moderate. In 2006, their focus was on promot-
ing economic growth; in 2008, it was on increasing labor market participation; and in 
2009, the INSM celebrated the virtues of the social market economy. The INSM has 
put more emphasis on celebrating existing reform achievements and defending them 
against rollback (for example, through a legislated minimum wage) than on pushing 
for further liberalization. An environment in which “reform politics aren’t mainstream 
anymore,” the INSM’s current director Hubertus Pellengahr told me, demands a dif-
ferent approach than one in which reform proponents can play an agenda-setting role 
(Pellengahr, interview 2013). Rodenstock recalls that following the Agenda 2010, “the 
wind was taken out of our sails. The topics were no longer perceived as being so urgent 
and conspicuous” (Rodenstock, interview 2013). An internal memo points toward set-
backs in the battle for discursive hegemony:
The political debate in 2007 was dominated by redistribution. The recognition that economi-
cally successful reforms are also profitable/beneficial for ordinary citizens did not prevail. In this 
conflict situation the Left Party, SPD and trade unions were able to successfully set the agenda 
for redistributive questions (minimum wages, maximum wages etc.) by offering solutions that 
appear to offer more security. All political parties, including the CDU/CSU, became involved 
in a debate about justice, which is mainly a debate about redistribution as the 2009 Bundestag 
elections approaches. (INSM 2009)
These developments support Ian Bruff ’s claim that the INSM has had limited success 
in “detaching a large enough portion of the social democratic and trade union opinion 
from their version of common sense” (Bruff 2008: 156). A study commissioned by the 
INSM draws attention to the gap between social understandings of justice/fairness and 
economic imperatives of efficiency: 
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The political establishment has missed the opportunity to make it clear to those affected that 
the reference to social justice cannot lie in a social safety system that is not sustainable in the 
medium- to long run. Instead they let themselves be intimidated by resistance against the acti-
vation strategy and tend to take back reforms to dynamize the labor market.
(Schneider/Eichhorst 2008: 12)
The financial crisis that began in 2008 compounded the INSM’s problems. According to 
insiders, the INSM faced the prospect of termination: as the bottom fell out of the global 
economy, it was unclear what discretionary expenditures Gesamtmetall would be able to 
sustain. With the rapid recovery of Germany’s export markets, these financial concerns 
faded into the background. While the INSM’s budget was reduced to 8.8 million euros per 
year (7 million euros after taxes), Gesamtmetall’s willingness to sustain this expenditure 
even during hard times attests to the INSM’s importance for its founders and funders.
Growing societal antipathy towards markets turned out to be a more serious prob-
lem. The financial crisis terminated the Reformdebatte, the push for market-oriented 
reforms: “From 2000-2005 we had the wind of history behind us. That changed with 
the financial crisis. We had a new field of debate” (Höfer, interview 2012). The INSM 
had been pushing for comprehensive liberalization but “forgot the deregulation of fi-
nancial markets” (Höfer, interview 2014). In response to the financial crisis, the INSM 
took a more moderate Ordoliberal position in order to prevent the market order itself 
from being made responsible and coming under attack: “The INSM had to react to 
these changed circumstances to avoid being labeled as radically neoliberal, as further 
demands for reforms would have been rejected as excessive and unrealistic” (Rath, in-
terview 2014). With the financial crisis, business’s discursive power declined, and their 
favored and preferred market liberal model was delegitimized. 
For the INSM, the ambiguity of the ideational construct “social market economy” turned 
out to be a blessing, for it could now present itself as an alternative to the very same 
neoliberal economic policies it had itself advocated just a few years earlier.11 With the 
financial crisis, the Anglophone neoliberal model lost much of its luster. Whereas in the 
earlier phase, the INSM praised the Anglo-American model and stressed the similarities 
between Ordoliberal and neoliberal ideas, with the onset of the financial crisis the INSM 
trumpeted the superiority of the social market economy and Ordoliberalism over other 
frameworks (Ordnungssysteme). In May 2009, in the midst of the US subprime crisis, 
the INSM hired an actor to play Ludwig Erhard, father of the social market economy, on 
Wall Street and convey the message that Germany’s social market economy is a model for 
the USA. The initiative took out a large banner ad on Wall Street which read: “Germany 
invented Asprin for your headache. We also got something for depression: Social Market 
Economy.” The message was that “American market fundamentalism can learn a great 
deal from the social market economy. We must return to these rules” (Höfer 2013: 25). 
11 If the INSM had been based on a different concept – for example, Ordoliberal Walter Eucken’s 
idea of a Wettbewerbsordnung or “competitive order” – its popular legitimacy would be harder 
to defend. 
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Meanwhile, the INSM was busy defending Schröder’s Agenda 2010 against politicians 
clamoring to re-regulate markets and introduce a statutory minimum wage. My in-
terviewees express admiration for Gerhard Schröder’s reforms and a general prefer-
ence for bourgeois parties.12 However, they have deep reservations – and in many cases 
overtly critical attitudes – towards Angela Merkel’s CDU-led governments for rolling 
back existing reforms and failing to pursue new ones. By 2013, for example, all German 
Länder had nullified university tuition fees, a policy the INSM had campaigned for. 
This suggests that the INSM was not supporting the CDU-FDP government in the 2013 
Bundestag elections, as Speth has claimed (2013). Instead, the INSM was campaigning 
against all the major parties who were seeking to roll back the Agenda 2010’s market-
oriented reforms. This development supports Pepper Culpepper’s argument that “busi-
ness power goes down as political salience goes up … Even parties of the right will 
throw their business allies under the bus once the cost of supporting them becomes too 
high” (Culpepper 2011: 177, 191). 
In this context, it is logical that Wolfgang Clement replaced Hans Tietmeyer at the head 
of the INSM’s board of trustees in 2012. While Tietmeyer’s age (of over 80 years) surely 
played a role, this move was entirely logical as the Agenda 2010 and Hartz labor market 
reforms were under attack. Clement has been affiliated with the INSM since its found-
ing. He had become Minister for Business and Labor in 2002 with one goal in mind: to 
transform Germany. In this role, Clement had played a pivotal role in pushing through 
the Hartz labor market reforms. Moreover, Clement was a man of conviction who re-
mained convinced of the need for far-reaching reforms even after his political party, the 
SPD, abandoned this agenda. In the 2009 Bundestag elections, Clement supported the 
FDP’s Guido Westerwelle, who five years earlier had stated that “the Hartz reforms were 
just the beginning and that much deeper cuts were needed” (Wolfrum 2013: 573). 
 “Firms are afraid that [the Agenda 2010] reforms will be taken back,” Hubertus Pellen-
gahr, the INSM’s current managing director, remarked prior to the 2013 Bundestag elec-
tions (Interview 2013). These fears came to fruition with the 2013 Bundestag elections. 
The resulting CDU-SPD coalition government has legislated a statutory minimum 
wage, effectively reversing a decade of labor market reforms. The INSM campaigned 
hard against this policy, and its passage represents a clear defeat for the INSM. Political 
debates in Germany have moved more and more onto the terrain of justice – gener-
ally inhospitable territory for business because of its association with anti-market and 
redistributive politics. The INSM has stayed true to its founding ideals and its commit-
ment to equality of opportunity. Against those who interpret justice only as distribu-
tive justice, the INSM has fought for a more nuanced and differentiated understanding 
which includes needs-based justice, equality of opportunity, and performance-related 
justice (Leistungsgerechtigkeit). Empirical studies commissioned by the INSM show that 
Germany performs better in these realms than many citizens believe. Pellengahr sum-
marizes the INSM’s activities in this difficult environment: 
12 See Goerres and Höpner (2014) for an analysis of business donations to political parties.
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We were the first ones who campaigned for the greater use of market mechanisms in the tran-
sition to renewable energy. While we were unable to challenge the popular legitimacy of the 
statutory minimum wage, we succeeded in getting all of the leading media to be against the 
pension law: who is going to pay for this largesse? We did not expect to prevent the law, but we 
did succeed in damage control: some important aspects of the law have changed. Through the 
so-called flexi-mortgage people may work longer if they wish. In 2013 we campaigned for social 
justice – traditionally a topic of the left – and pleaded for a more nuanced and differentiated 
understanding that includes equality of opportunity. Our long term goal is to change politics 
and policy. (Pellengahr, interview 2014)
The aforementioned discussion raises the question: is there a relationship between eco-
nomic conditions and the INSM’s influence over the reform agenda? The figures below 
show Germany’s growth and unemployment rates and major INSM campaigns during 
the past fourteen years. The darker shading indicates a more pro-active and agenda-set-
ting role for the INSM (“Market Oriented Reform Concepts”), while the lighter shading 
indicates more reactive and defensive campaigns. 
The high unemployment and low growth rates in the early-to-mid 2000s almost cer-
tainly increased the supply and demand for reforms, underlining that crises are mo-
ments of opportunity for liberalizers. The Great Recession of 2009 is, of course, a no-
table exception. To summarize, it appears that party politics, the public opinion climate, 
and economic circumstances influence the ability of neo-liberal campaigns such as the 
INSM to persevere in the war of ideas over economic policy. The next section discusses 
what leading employers have to say about institutions. 
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7 Towards a more dynamic, conflictual, and contested view of institutions 
My interviewees have diverse views on the usefulness of Germany’s non-liberal institu-
tions. They appreciate the benefits of wage moderation and a cooperative industrial 
relations culture and support the institution of co-determination up to a certain point: 
Co-determination is useful. The INSM could never have been founded if it had aimed to abol-
ish co-determination. We support co-determination in the right configuration. Entrepreneurial 
and managerial freedom must be preserved. We do have situations where it goes too far, but the 
basic idea is right. (Brocker, interview 2013) 
I think that most firms think that co-determination is good … but only to a certain point. That 
point begins where the entrepreneur is no longer in control of his own decisions and has to 
ask the works council for approval. It becomes difficult when  the entrepreneur is no longer in 
control of his own decisions. (Engemann, interview 2013)
Both Brocker and Engemann underline the importance of employer discretion, a point 
that is frequently neglected by VofC-inspired treatments of institutions that empha-
size cross-class interests and the efficiency enhancing effects of CME institutions. The 
dynamic and unpredictable nature of global market competition and the “loose fit” 
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between institutions and company strategies (Jürgens 2004) may help to explain my 
interviewees’ universal emphasis on the need for ever-greater flexibility (Brocker ,in-
terview 2013; Fasbender, interview 2013; Rodenstock, interview 2013). The reforms of 
the past decade are certainly helpful, but they do not go far enough, and they have only 
partly succeeded in preventing a reduction in “employers’ freedom and autonomy. It 
is experiencing creeping erosion. That’s the yeast in the dough” (Fickinger, interview 
2012). Fasbender is more skeptical of the benefits of the German model: 
What we produce here we can also produce in any other country. Today everything you can do 
in Germany you can also do pretty much anywhere else. The idea that “it only works in Ger-
many,” that idea is gone. Institutions in general may be useful – but this really depends on their 
specific manifestation. Not traditional institutions, but the reforms since the late 1990s have led 
to our current successes. (Fasbender, interview 2013)
Fasbender contradicts VofC in three ways. First, he categorically denies that Germany’s 
non-liberal institutions provide it with any comparative institutional advantage. Ger-
man companies can produce in Germany or elsewhere; they are not dependent on Ger-
many’s institutional framework. Fasbender’s statement points to a central weakness in 
the VofC literature: its advocates provide little empirical support for the claim that Ger-
man employers’ production strategies and competitive success are heavily dependent 
on Germany’s CME institutions.13
There are many reasons to be skeptical of this claim. Baccaro and Benassi find that “Ger-
man exports have … become significantly more price sensitive than in the past (2014: 
12). In 2013, the German car industry built 59 percent more cars outside of Germany 
than it did inside the country (Heymann 2014). According to Eric Heymann’s analysis, 
it is two and a half times more likely that Germany’s position as an auto-making pro-
duction location will deteriorate in the coming decade than it is that significant new 
investments will be made to increase production capacity there. By 2016, BMW’s fac-
tory in Spartenburg, South Carolina will have a larger capacity than any BMW factory 
13 In this vein, Kathleen Thelen claims that “Manufacturing employers continue to support [the 
core arrangements characteristic of the traditional model] as crucial to their continued success 
on world export markets” (Thelen 2014: 58). Since an exhaustive analysis of this issue would 
take me beyond the scope of this paper, a few examples will have to suffice. Between 1997 and 
2003, approximately one quarter of German companies in the metalworking industry relocated 
production abroad (see Kinkel/Maloca 2009: 3). This suggests that VofC overstates German 
employers’ dependence on dometic institutions. In his examination of the German automobile 
industry, Ulrich Jürgens finds that firms’ production strategies are more dynamic and more 
loosely coupled with national and shop-floor institutions than VofC allows: “The dynamics of 
change in the automotive industry have not been adequately reflected in the debate on the Ger-
man model. The concept of a model does not reflect the contradictions, tensions and dynamics 
inherent to production systems. There may be no production model that is stable in the long 
run. Instead, the ‘fit’ between institutions and company strategies is much looser than is often 
argued. With the fragmentation of process chains in the industry, the core of the German au-
tomotive system no longer is the shop-floor production system, but rather inter-organizational 
co-operation within product development and production networks” (Jürgens 2004: 412, 422).
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in Germany. This also casts doubt on VofC pronouncements that German employers 
depend on traditional CME institutions.
Second, Fasbender implies that the extent to which institutions provide any competitive 
institutional advantage is variable, contextual, and contingent. This is very much in line 
with recent work on the contestedness of institutions and on incremental and slow-
moving change (and in line with what we know about the transformation of co-de-
termination from an instrument of workplace democracy to co-management). Third, 
Fasbender charges that Germany’s liberalizing reforms since the 1990s, rather than its 
non-liberal institutions, are responsible for the country’s competitive resurgence. The 
figure below speaks to this claim. 
This figure shows Germany’s competition-weighted relative unit labor costs relative to 
other major capitalist democracies. Germany’s competitive position has improved sig-
nificantly since the mid-1990s, and dramatically since the mid-2000s. Germany’s re-
surgence coincides with the liberalization of labor markets and collective bargaining 
institutions from the early 2000s onwards. As a result of these reforms, 
The share of German workers covered by any kind of union agreement has sharply declined, 
and the number of firm-level deviations from industry-wide agreements has sharply increased 
… Overall, these gradual changes within the system led to an unprecedented decentralization of 
the wage-setting process from the industry level to the firm level.
(Dustmann/Fitzenberger/Schönberg/Spitz-Oener 2014: 168) 
Figure 4 Evolution of competition-weighted relative unit labor costs, selected countries, 
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Whereas Kinderman (2005) claims that Germany’s traditional institutions were failing 
to satisfy employer needs in the period up to 2005, Manuel Nicklich (2013) reports that 
employers’ associations’ satisfaction with wage bargaining arrangements has increased. 
Looking at Figure 4, it is not hard to see why. Employees, works councils, and trade 
unions have made far-reaching concessions to employer demands. INSM affiliate Karl-
Heinz Paqué celebrates these changes:
Germany has changed as a Wirtschaftsstandort during the past two decades. The country has 
become a production location that is not only highly innovative – it always was – but also of-
fers a high degree of flexibility. Germany is no longer a citadel of Rhenish Capitalism in which 
powerful employers’ associations and unions hinder adjustment to world market fluctuations.
(Paqué 2011: 25)
Even if many employers have failed to achieve their preferred objective of full-scale 
liberalization, Figure 4 suggests that their second-best alternative, which has entailed 
far-reaching concessions by employees and a reengineering of the existing system, has 
worked well for employers during recent years. Given the dramatic improvement of 
Germany’s macroeconomic and competitive position, it is not surprising that German 
employers have chosen to leave the wage bargaining system formally intact. 
Whereas in the mid-2000s, many German managers could not resist “the enticing shores 
of a neo-liberal market economy without corporatist obligations” (Streeck 2005: 11), 
the Anglo-American model lost much of its allure with the financial crisis. The latter, 
and the concessions made by employees, may have led some critics who were enamored 
with the Anglo-American model to moderate their demands for full-scale liberalization. 
Perhaps they have even re-discovered the virtues of the new German model, leading to 
a change in employers’ underlying interests and preferences. However, I expect that this 
support will only persist as long as conditions for German firms continue to develop 
favorably. When conditions become unfavorable, employers will again campaign ag-
gressively to reform and transform these institutions, as we have seen with the INSM 
from 2000 until 2006. While the above figures suggest that economic circumstances 
have influenced the stance and effectiveness of the INSM over the past fourteen years, 
we should not neglect the possibility that the market-oriented ideas disseminated by the 
INSM have themselves contributed to the increasing business-friendliness of German 
institutions and the cost competitiveness of German firms. The next section addresses 
objections to my argument. 
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8 Addressing objections to my argument
In this section, I address two objections to my argument. First, VofC scholars may ar-
gue that they never claimed German employers would defend every detail of the Ger-
man system, only its basic institutional underpinnings: sectoral wage bargaining and 
co-determination.14 Extending this line of thought, a comparison of German employers 
with employers in LMEs would reveal that the former’s demands for liberalization are 
more moderate than the latter’s. In the UK in the late-1980s, for example, Thatcherite 
John Hoskyns outlined a radical agenda for institutional reform. Hoskyns excoriated 
collective bargaining, which he described as “obsolescent” and “out of date:” employ-
ees should be treated as “individuals not as collective factors of production” (Hoskyns 
1988). By contrast, collective bargaining institutions (Tarifautonomie), board-level co-
determination and works councils enjoy a great deal of support among large German 
firms (see Höpner/Waclawczyk [2012] for co-determination and Paster [2014] for col-
lective bargaining institutions). The fact that the INSM’s main object of critique is the 
welfare state – and not wage bargaining institutions, co-determination or works coun-
cils – seems to support this claim. 
There is an element of truth in this position; my response is threefold. First, the core 
of my argument is that German employers have not acted as a constraint on liberaliza-
tion. Instead, they have vigorously promoted it through the INSM. In the absence of the 
INSM, Germany would almost certainly be less liberalized than it is today. Second, as 
Baccaro and Howell point out, institutions are “highly malleable,” and transforming in-
stitutions by reducing burdensome constraints and “expand[ing] employer discretion” 
is sometimes preferable to dismantling them (Baccaro/Howell 2011: 522, 527), especial-
ly given the disruptions and costs that dismantling can entail. But it seems problematic 
to claim that employers defend traditional institutions when what employers are in fact 
doing is transforming and reengineering institutions from within. 
Third, it is necessary to fully appreciate the importance of context. For historical and 
cultural reasons, Germany is a comparatively inhospitable environment for neoliberal 
ideas and policy proposals. Security and stability are important cultural values, much to 
the dismay of Karen Horn, one of Germany’s self-ascribed neoliberals: 
German society hungers and thirsts for security … The German values monitor, a study of the 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom based on representative surveys, shows Germans’ 
fears of freedom and their desire for security. Self-reliance, the work ethic or competition are 
declining in popularity; collectivist values like security and order, solidarity and social justice are 
high in currency. Only thirty percent identify with the market economy as an important value. 
The Germans do not love the market and that’s why they invented the social market economy 
with its emphasis on solidarity and security. This orientation towards security has crystallized 
itself over decades and leaves its marks on all aspects of politics. (Horn 2012: 110, 2010: 55)
14 I am grateful to Thomas Paster for insights and formulations in this section. 
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Given the more limited resonance of neoliberal ideas in Germany compared with other 
states and the “unfavourable institutional conditions for major reforms” (Fleckenstein 
2013: 64), the question is not why we fail to observe full liberalization in Germany but 
how can it be that we observe as much as we do? In spite of the aforementioned ob-
stacles, German employers support liberalization to a much greater extent than VofC 
allows. Liberalization is Gesamtmetall’s default position. In addition, it is essential to 
recognize that neo-liberalism itself is protean; and that Ordoliberalism, the German va-
riety of economic liberalism (Haselbach 1997: 169), “is substantially less different from 
other streams of neoliberal thought than many have thought” (Ptak 2009: 99). The next 
section concludes the paper. 
9 Conclusion
Varieties of Capitalism’s counterintuitive and “extraordinarily reassuring” view of em-
ployer preferences has helped it to become “hegemonic” during the past decade.15 In an 
era of capital mobility and business power, the notion that different Varieties of Capital-
ism “operate according to different logics” (Hall/Thelen 2009: 24) can only be sustained 
if employers truly support and defend non-liberal institutions. Drawing on Lakatos, 
VofC’s conception of business interests can be seen as part of the theory’s theoretical 
core. In this paper, I have challenged it. Through an analysis of the New Social Market 
Initiative (INSM) from 2000–2014, I have argued that VofC’s understanding of German 
employer preferences is flawed for this time period.16 It is ironic that employers found-
ed this organization with an explicit mandate to promote liberalization just as Hall and 
Soskice’s influential volume was going to press. By the end of 2018, Gesamtmetall will 
have spent approximately 160 million euros funding the INSM’s activities. 
While VofC stresses the imperative importance of non-market coordination for em-
ployers in CMEs, the INSM advocates for more market coordination in all areas of 
social and economic life: it has put wind in the sails of liberalization since its founding 
fourteen years ago. To be sure, it is hard to find definitive empirical proof of what em-
ployers really want. But in light of the evidence presented in this paper, the burden of 
proof is on those who believe that employers do not really want what they say. The bot-
tom line is that it’s hard to reconcile the existence of the INSM, an initiative dedicated 
to promoting large-scale liberalization, with the idea that employers defend traditional 
institutions. Despite changing campaigns and emphases over time, the INSM’s overall 
message is clear: a celebration, legitimation and defense of the unencumbered market, 
and a harsh critique of the welfare state. While the intellectual pedigree of the INSM is 
15 Kathleen Thelen, remarks given at lecture at the Penn Temple European Studies colloquium, 
Philadelphia, USA; December 6, 2013.
16 It is possible that VofC was accurate in the past and that employer preferences have changed.
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Ordoliberal, the differences in comparison with Anglophone neoliberalism should not 
be overstated. As Stephanie Mudge points out, the “elevation of the market … over all 
other modes of organization” is neoliberalism’s “ideological core” (Mudge 2008: 705). 
The paper has also sought to shed light on changes in the INSM’s orientation and strat-
egy over time. In the period from 2000–2005, the INSM played an agenda setting role 
by paving the way for the Agenda 2010 labor market reforms and by coming up with 
some of its central slogans. From 2003 to 2005, the INSM articulated radical critiques of 
the German model which point towards a Systemwechsel – a system change – away from 
CME and towards LME-style institutions. Many INSM representatives and employers 
viewed the Hartz and Agenda 2010 labor market reforms as the beginning and not the 
terminus of liberalization. Since 2006, and especially since 2009, the INSM’s positions 
have become more moderate. The INSM has sought to defend existing reform achieve-
ments against retrenchment, but it has had to swim with the tide of public opinion and 
moderate its positions in order to remain relevant to public opinion and political de-
bates. In the first period, the INSM achieved many victories. In the second period, in the 
context of the heightened salience of social and distributional issues and reduced busi-
ness legitimacy, the INSM has sustained many defeats in its attempt to defend market-
liberal reforms against re-regulation. 
I have argued that the INSM’s moderation in the second period should be understood 
as a response to a growing anti-liberalization sentiment and electoral pressures rather 
than as an indication of employer support for the institutional status quo. At the same 
time I have pointed out that improvements in firms’ competitiveness, reductions in unit 
wage costs, as well as the crisis of the Anglophone model may also explain the INSM’s 
moderation. This suggests a nuanced and dynamic relationship between ideas and in-
terests, as Marx and Weber have long recognized. It does not contradict my argument 
that German employers have a genuine preference for liberalization, but it suggests that 
employer strategies and interests are complex and influenced by a variety of factors. The 
paper thus points out the limitations of business power as well as its strength. In the 
end, Gesamtmetall’s investment of large sums of cash in a cutting-edge professional PR 
campaign based on “a hard appraisal of the malleability of social reality and of people 
themselves” (Jackall 1988: 164) has been insufficient to convince German policy-mak-
ers and citizens of the continued necessity of reforms. This suggests that business does 
not always win, and that “there is always a fighting chance” (Streeck 2009: 268) for those 
who seek to reign in the market. 
The rise of the INSM coincides with the progressive disorganization of German capital-
ism (Höpner 2004) and the increasing heterogeneity of employers’ associations. The 
fact that German employers have initiated and pursued a seemingly coherent liberaliza-
tion agenda through the INSM flies in the face of claims that divergences in interests 
prevent employers from articulating coherent association- and industry-wide positions. 
Of course, the fact that Gesamtmetall and its regional employers’ associations support 
the INSM does not imply that all German employers or even Gesamtmetall members 
Kinderman: Challenging Varieties of Capitalism’s Account of Business Interests 27
do. It is certainly possible that the INSM’s positions are too radical for some firms. Yet 
I have found no evidence to support the claim that the INSM is an attempt to appease 
discontented managers within employers’ associations. Why not? 
The explanation may well lie in the inherent asymmetry between liberalization and 
organization. This could help to explain why even firms that do not actively support the 
INSM agenda see no need to oppose it. As Paster (2012b) has argued, as long as volun-
tary practices remain viable, liberalization can accommodate critics as well as defenders 
of the institutional status quo, whereas the institutional status quo cannot accommo-
date critics. Thus, while the INSM does not show that all German employers in the 
metalworking industry have a genuine preference for liberalization, it does show that a 
significant number do; and that contrary to VofC, those that don’t are unwilling or un-
able to defend the institutional status quo. Gesamtmetall could not sustain a campaign 
of 130 million euros over the course of fourteen years that did not enjoy support from 
a large number of their members.17 
In conclusion, this paper has argued that the claim that German employers will de-
fend traditional institutions against liberalization is untenable. This does not imply that 
employers are always at war with market-constraining institutions.18 After far-reach-
ing institutional reforms and concessions by employees and the crisis of Anglophone 
LMEs, and in the face of growing societal opposition to further liberalization, Ger-
man employers toned down their demands for liberalization. But following new welfare 
state largesse and the re-regulation of labor markets, “the discontentment of business 
is growing and a new Standortdebatte (debate on Germany as a production location) is 
taking place in German companies” (Hüther, interview 2014). To understand these de-
velopments, liberalization theorists’ view of capitalism as unruly and disruptive19 pro-
vides a promising starting point. 
17 Much of my argument has been based on the assumption that the INSM reflects an aggregation 
of employers’ association members’ interests. But as Behrens (2011: 215) points out, employ-
ers’ associations do not simply aggregate the interests of their members; through their actions, 
employers’ associations shape those underlying interests. The extent to which the INSM has 
strengthened and reinforced firms’ underlying interests is unclear, but the greater this effect, the 
greater the damage to VofC conceptions of employer interests. 
18 See Julien Etienne and Gerhard Schnyder, “Logics of action and models of capitalism: Explain-
ing bottom-up non-liberal change” (Swiss Political Science Review, forthcoming) for a fascinat-
ing account of Swiss employers’ role in non-liberal instutional change. 
19 Chris Howell, remarks given at the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, Chicago, 
July 2014. 
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